Illustration by The New York Times; images by Yelyzaveta Bondar and Dzyuba/Getty ImagesKeyu Jin is in the West but not entirely of it. She’s fluent in English and French, studied at Harvard and teaches at the London School of Economics. She knows her way around Goldman Sachs and the World Bank. But she is still a proud Chinese. She lived with her parents in Beijing during two recent maternity leaves. And she has just written a book about what she calls “reading China in the original.” Unfiltered, that is, by a Western perspective.
金刻羽身在西方，但并没有西化。她精通英语和法语，曾就读于哈佛大学，现在伦敦政经学院任教。她在高盛和世界银行里游刃有余。但她仍然是一个骄傲的中国人。在最近的两次产假期间，她与父母住在北京。她刚刚写了一本书，她称之为“阅读原版中国”。也就是说，未经过西方视角的过滤。
It sometimes comes as a surprise to Europeans and Americans that Chinese people who have seen and enjoyed the best of the West nevertheless prefer China. What about the lack of democracy and the repression of minorities such as the Uyghurs and Tibetans? The pollution? The threats against Taiwan and incursions in the South China Sea?
有时令欧洲人和美国人感到惊讶的是，中国人在目睹并享受了西方最好的东西后，仍然偏爱中国。中国不是缺乏民主吗？对维吾尔人和藏人等少数民族的镇压怎么办？污染问题？对台湾的威胁和在南海的进犯？
Jin doesn’t ignore China’s faults and failings in “The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism,” which was published on Tuesday. But she tells a nuanced story that deserves attention at a time of extreme tension between China and the United States.
在周二出版的《新中国策略：超越社会主义和资本主义》(The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism)中，金刻羽没有忽视中国的缺点和失败。但是，在中美关系极度紧张之际，她讲述了一个值得关注的微妙故事。
Consider this, for example: The United States is a democracy, and China isn’t, of course. But the latest World Values Survey, conducted from 2017 to 2020, indicates that 95 percent of Chinese participants had significant confidence in their government, compared to 33 percent in the United States. Similarly, 93 percent of Chinese participants valued security over freedom; only 28 percent of Americans did so.
比如看这样的数据：美国是民主国家，而中国显然不是。但2017年至2020年进行的最新“世界价值观调查”表明，95%的中国参与者对他们的政府充满信心，而美国的这一比例为33%。同样，93%的中国参与者认为安全比自由重要；只有28%的美国人这样想。
“Chinese citizens expect the government to take on larger roles in social and economic issues and do not see interventions as infringements on liberty,” Jin wrote.
“中国的国民认为政府应该在社会和经济问题上发挥更大的作用，并不认为干预是对自由的侵犯，”金刻羽写道。
Wrapping your mind around those stark cultural differences is the first step toward “reading China in the original,” just as you get more out of reading Baudelaire in the original French or Mad magazine in the original English.
迈向“阅读原版中国”的第一步，是要明白存在这些巨大的文化差异，就像阅读波德莱尔著作的法文原版或《疯狂杂志》(Mad)的英文原版一样。
In her opening chapter, Jin described her collision-of-cultures experiences as an exchange student in the 1990s at the Horace Mann School, an elite private school in the Bronx. Outside of class, she was asked, “Do you feel oppressed?” She quickly got involved in local politics. “That a proud Youth League member of the Communist Party could find herself immersed in an American family actively involved in democratic campaigns, conventions and fund-raising seemed utterly surreal,” she wrote.
金刻羽在全书第一章描述了她在1990年代作为交换生在哈瑞斯曼中学经历的文化冲撞，那是布朗克斯的一所精英私立学校。在课外，她被问到，“你感到被压迫吗？”她很快就参与了地方政治。“一个自豪的共青团员会发现自己沉浸在一个积极参与民主运动、大会和筹款活动的美国家庭中，看上去完全是超现实的，”她写道。
Much of the book recounts China’s economic miracle. In her final chapter, “Toward a New Paradigm,” she wrote that China’s leadership “fervently wishes” to avoid vast inequality that breeds distrust and extremism. “China seeks an olive-shaped income distribution for its people, ample in the middle and narrow at the extremes.”
这本书有相当一部分内容在讲述中国的经济奇迹。在最后一章《迈向新范式》中，她写道，中国领导层“热切希望”避免广泛的不平等，因为那会滋生不信任和极端主义。“中国为其人民寻求橄榄形的收入分配，中间庞大，两头稀少。”
China, she wrote, requires that its companies be hefa, heli and heqing — that is, lawful, reasonable and empathetic. Chinese government at all levels “will need to recede to the background while letting markets and entrepreneurs do the work” — but the mechanisms for making that happen “are not yet part of the new playbook.”
她写道，中国要求本国的公司“合法、合理、合情”。中国各级政府“需要退居幕后，让市场和企业家来发挥作用”——但实现这一目标的机制“还未成为新策略的一部分”。
When I interviewed Jin a couple of weeks ago I asked whether she had pulled punches to avoid offending China’s leadership. “I don’t talk about political issues,” she said. “To be frank, this is an economics work.” She added: “Perhaps it would be helpful for Americans to be aware that in China, the problems are overwhelmingly domestic. Chinese are not always thinking about America.”
几周前采访金刻羽时，我问她是否为了避免冒犯中国领导层而有所保留。“我不谈论政治问题，”她说。“坦率地说，这是一部经济学作品。”她还说：“要意识到在中国，绝大多数问题都在国内，这样想或许会对美国人有所帮助。中国人并不总是想着美国。”
To me, her freshest chapter is about China’s “mayor economy.” China aspires to have a meritocratic bureaucracy (although corruption remains serious). Officials who excel at one level are moved up or transferred laterally to gain experience. For comparison, imagine if Ron DeSantis tried to please President Biden so Biden would promote him to governor of California from governor of Florida.
对我来说，她最新颖的一章是关于中国的“市长经济”。中国渴望拥有贤能的官僚机构（尽管腐败依然严重）。在一个级别上表现出色的官员会被提拔或横向调动以积累经验。相比之下，这就好比罗恩·德桑蒂斯为了让拜登总统把他从佛罗里达州州长提拔为加利福尼亚州州长而取悦他。
Political leaders at the township, municipal and provincial levels used to focus on raw output, relying on state-owned enterprise to churn out more steel, cement and so on. But now, in Jin’s view, these “mayors” are focused on harnessing the creativity of the private sector.
乡镇、市和省级的政治领导人过去把重点放在原材料产量上，依靠国有企业生产更多的钢铁、水泥等。但现在，在金刻羽看来，这些“市长”正专注于利用私营部门的创造力。
But, I asked Jin, isn’t President Xi Jinping trying to reassert government control over the “commanding heights” of the economy? “Don’t read too much into grandiose messages,” she responded. “The reality today is that the private sector is fully in the driver’s seat.” The best evidence of that is the Chinese economy’s slow rebound from its Covid shutdown, she said. “The reason it’s sluggish is precisely that there’s a lack of confidence in the private sector,” she said. “The old playbook of calling on Team China to do large infrastructure, that is no longer working.”
但是，我问金刻羽，习近平主席不是要重申政府对经济“制高点”的控制吗？“不要过多解读浮夸的信息，”她回答道。“今天的现实是，私营部门完全掌握了主导权。”她说，最好的证据是中国经济从新冠限制中缓慢反弹。“之所以不景气，恰恰是对私营部门缺乏信心，”她说。“呼吁‘国家队’合力进行大型基础设施建设的老套路已经行不通了。”
I asked her about Chinese leaders’ fears of a disengaged “lying flat” generation. It’s real, she said: “Lying flat is associated with few marriages and reduced expectations.” On the other hand, she said, young Chinese aren’t exactly giving up; they just don’t want to do manual labor or other unappealing work: “They’re interested in innovating to solve society’s problems, not just survival of the fittest.”
我问她如何看中国领导人对置身事外的“躺平”一代的恐惧。这是真的，她说：“躺平关系到低结婚率和降低期望值。”另一方面，她说，中国年轻人并没有完全放弃；他们只是不想做体力劳动或其他没有吸引力的工作：“他们感兴趣的是通过创新来解决社会问题，而不仅仅是适者生存。”
Young Chinese “are more open-minded, more socially conscious, more tolerant, more accepting of diversity,” she said. But that does not make them pro-American. “They like Hollywood and the N.B.A. and they like their experience in the West,” she said. “But it’s not contradictory with the fact that they choose to be close to home and invent local culture.”
她说，中国年轻人“思想更开放，更有社会意识，更宽容，更能接受多样性。”但这并不能使他们亲美国。“他们喜欢好莱坞和NBA。他们喜欢在西方的经历，”她说。“但这与他们选择离家近的地方并创造当地文化并不矛盾。”
For the Chinese, “the bottom line is to avoid an American-style capitalism,” Jin said, coming back to the metaphor of an olive-shaped income distribution. Essentially, she said, “China wants to be a bigger and smarter Germany. More managed capitalism.”
金刻羽说，回到橄榄形收入分配的比喻，对于中国人来说，“底线是避免美式资本主义。”她说，从本质上讲，“中国希望成为一个更大、更明智的德国。更受控的资本主义。”
Peter Coy撰写与商业相关的文章已有近40年，欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@petercoy。
翻译：纽约时报中文网
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